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neous objection rule, Waye could not raise the issue on appeal unless
he could show cause under Sykes. The most common "cause" is an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, which requires a defendant to
meet the stringent two-part test of Strickland. Alton Waye was
executed on August 30, 1989.
No one can predict which claims the United States Supreme
Court will recognize in the years to come. Sykes does recognize later
"new law" as an excuse for not raising claims at trial. Nevertheless,
because of Virginia's contemporaneous objection rule, unless a claim
was unheardof before a client's trial, failure to object at trial will
close the door to federal collateral review for a capital defendant. The
only protection the attorney representing a capital defendant can
provide a client is to know allexisting law, including "logical
extensions" of that law. This includes the law of your own state, but
also the law of any jurisdiction with similar capital statutes.
Of course, this is impossible. No one has the unlimited time and
resources such a task would require. Nevertheless, federal courts
require such foresight. The attorney's only defense is to use his or her
own sense of fairness to guide making of objections at trial.

Additionally, it is critical to tie every objection to the 6th, 8th
and 14th amendments of the United States Constitution. This is
necessary because, even if an objection was made to the correct issue
at trial, if the court overrules an objection on purely state law
grounds, federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the claim.
Trial counsel must assert a federal basis for every objection. One
arguable basis is the necessity for a heightened degree of reliability in
death penalty cases ("super due process") under the 8th and 14th
amendments and Woodson v. North Carolina,428 U.S. 280,305
(1976).
As to matters that implicate only state law in non-capital cases,
the United States Supreme Court has sometimes required the higher
standard, and sometimes not. Greenv. Georgia,442 U.S. 586, 99 S.
Ct. 2150, 60 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1978), for example, overrode a state
hearsay rule to require consideration of mitigating evidence.
Strickland itself, however, refused to impose a higher standard of
competence for attorneys in capital cases.
Summary and analysis by: Diane U. Montgomery
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The defendant received two separate trials for the murders
of two women. In both of the trials the jury found him guilty of
capital murder and deserving of the death penalty. He appealed the
conviction and sentence of both trials asserting numerous assignments of error. In reviewing the alleged errors the Supreme Court of
Virginia, in two per curiam opinions by Justice Stephenson, affirmed
the conviction and sentence of the defendant and held that "DNA
printing" is both a reliable and admissible form of identification
evidence. In addition, Spencer II reviewed alleged errors pertaining
to the selection of prospective jurors and assignments of error
regarding the admission of evidence.
NOTE: Although they are two separate cases, due to the similarity of
the facts and holdings both decisions will be discussed in a single
summary. Also, all Spencer citations are to LEXIS pages.
FACTS
Timothy Wilson Spencer was arrested and charged with the
rape and murder of both Susan Tucker and Debbie Dudley Davis.
The murders occurred approximately ten weeks apart in 1987. In
each case, Spencer entered the dwellings through a ground floor
window. Both victims were found strangled in their bed, naked or
partially clothed. Each victim was bound in a similar fashion; their
wrists were tied behind their back and the bindings connected to a
ligature around their neck.
At both locations the police found hair that was described
as "characteristically Negroid" in origin, as well as semen stains on
the victims' bedding. Upon analysis, the hair samples removed from
the scene were found to be "consistent with Spencer's underarm
hair". Spencer 11, at 4. Further, the testing indicated that the semen
stains on the bedding were deposited by a "secretor" (an individual
whose bodily fluids exhibit chemical traits of the person's blood). Id.
The chemical properties of the stains were found to be consistent
with those of a member of a blood group comprising about 13 percent
of the population, a group to which Spencer belongs. Id. The
prosecution had the DNA structures in the semen stains compared to

known blood samples taken from the defendant. This process
identified the semen stains and blood samples as belonging to the
same person and the court noted that the chance of mis-identification
error had a statistical probability numbering 1 in 705 million. Id. at 5.
HOLDING
In Spencer II, defendant asserted (44) separate assignments
of error, many of which the court dismissed as being without merit.
Many of the other alleged errors were dismissed as being based on
well settled areas of law, such as the claim that the death penalty
violated both the U.S. and Virginia Constitutions. However, four
holdings issued by the court deserve analysis because they involve
either a new and previously undeveloped area of the law, or discuss
common error committed by defense attorneys.
The summarized holdings are: (1) That "DNA printing" is t
reliable and admissible form of identification evidence; (2) That onc(
a prima facie Batson challenge is made, the prosecution has the
burden of articulating raciallyneutral reasons for its exclusion of
potential jurors; (3) That the objection to the seating of a juror made
during voir dire is deemed waived unless restated immediately prior
to the actual seating of that juror; and (4) That an alleged restriction
in the defendant's cross-examination of a witness cannot be appealec
where the defense counsel failed to proffer evidence, on the record,
regarding the nature of the proposed questions and the witness's
answers to those questions.
ANALYSIS
(1) DNA PRINTING:
Spencer alleged that the trial court erred in admitting into
evidence the results of a DNA analysis comparing his blood to the
semen stains found at the scene of the crimes. Spencer II, at 27.
Specifically, Spencer claimed that the prosecution had not proved thi
reliabilityof DNA testing procedures. Id. at 29.
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DNA printing is a relatively new scientific process. It
involves the comparing of the internal molecules of an individual's
chromosomes. Chromosomes are essentially the building blocks of
each person's characteristics, for example, hair color, color of the
eyes, height, etc. The molecules that make up each chromosome, and
give the chromosome its genetic pattern are the DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) molecules.
In a testing procedure such as the one utilized in these
cases, the first step is to extract a sample of the DNA molecule from
the semen stain left at the scene of the crime. Id. at 5. The sample is
then chemically treated to cause the molecule to fragment into
particular sections. These sections are then arranged according to
length on a sheet of electrically charged gel. The internal "pairing" of
each of these sections is then separated in a fashion the court
analogized, in Spencer I, to the opening of a zipper. Once separated,
they are transferred to a nylon membrane and bombarded with
radioactively charged "probes" that are designed to mesh with only
one particular type of fragment. After the probes have found their
appropriate sites, the remaining probes are washed from the surface
of the membrane. Following this irrigation the membrane is exposed
to an x-ray film. The remaining sections emit radioactive energy
which is displayed on the film in a particular and unique band
pattern. The same procedure is conducted on a known sample of the
accused's DNA in order to compare the visible patterns.
Despite uncontradicted expert testimony that the procedures were properly performed and the test results highly reliable,
Spencer asserted that the trial court erred when it admitted the results
into evidence. Id. at 27. In holding that the trial court did not err
when it admitted the results into evidence, the court noted and
accepted as fact the statistical accuracy of the testing. Id. at 29. The
court indicated that the chances of another individual, other than an
identical twin, having the same DNA print are 1 in 705 million. Id. at
28. Further, the court emphasized the significance of this statistic by
pointing out that there are presently only about 10 million adult black
males in this country. Id. at 5. The expert witnesses also testified that
if the procedures were improperly performed it would not cause a
"false-positive" result, but would instead result in a failure to match
the DNA prints.
Future litigation regarding novel scientific testing procedures such as DNA analysis may lead to defense motions for expert
analysis to enable the defendant to challenge the State's evidence.
Under a line of authority exemplified by Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S.
68 (1985), indigent defendants are entitled to the "basic tools" to
foster a viable defense. It would seem that expert analysis would be
the only conceivable method available to the defense to contradict or
challenge evidence similar to that utilized in Spencer.
':2) BATSON CHALLENGE:
In 1986, the U.S. Supreme Court held that"'the Equal
?. rotection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors
; olely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors
ts a group will be unable imnpartially to consider the State's case
igainst a black defendant."' Spencer II, at 20 (quoting Batson v.
"(entucky,476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986)).
Spencer alleged that the Commonwealth violated the
iolding in Batson when the prosecution used its four peremptory
trikes to remove only black jurors. Id. In holding that the trial court
:orrectly found that the prosecution had not violated Batson, the
ourt referred to basic tests for evaluating a Batson challenge. The
irst element the defendant must show is that the prosecution has
itilized its peremptory strikes to remove members of the accused's
: acial group. Id. Once the accused proves the first part of the test, the
econd part shifts the burden to the prosecutor who is then required to

articulate a "racially neutral" reason for striking the juror in question.
Id. at21.
In this case, the trial court found that the prosecution was
not racially motivated in the use of its peremptory strikes. Id. at 22.
The reasons given for excluding the venireman included past criminal
activity, alleged lack of required knowledge, and inconsistent
statements. Id. at 21. Further, the court noted that the reputationand
pastpracticesof the prosecutorregarding the use of peremptory
strikes were relevant to the determination of credibility. Id.
(3) OBJECTION TO THE SEATING OF A JUROR:
During the voir dire examination of the potential jurors,
Spencer's attorney attempted to ask a question intended to show bias
on the part of one juror. The trial court held that the question was
improper. Id. at 14. Spencer objected to the trial court's ruling, but
did not restate his objection at the time the juror was seated. In
rejecting Spencer's claim of error the court stated, "If a party objects
to rulings made during the voir dire of a prospective juror, but
subsequently fails to object to the seating of that juror, the party has
waived the voir dire objections." Id. at 15 (emphasis added). Further,
the court held that unless the grounds on which the objection is based
are specifically preserved at the time of the trial court's ruling, the
claim will not be reviewed on appeal. Id.
As discussed in other summaries contained in this issue,
contemporaneousobjection, on the record, and at each phase of the
trial is of the utmost importance in order to preserve issues for
appeal. (See Buchanan summary this issue; also Virginia S. Ct. Rule
5:25).
(4) FAILURE OF DEFENSE TO PROFFER:
Spencer claimed that during a pretrial hearing he was
unjustifiably limited in his cross examination of one of the Commonwealth's expert witnesses, a Dr. Roberts. Id. at 13. He also made a
similar claim of error concerning the testimony of a Detective
Williams.
In both cases, the court emphasized that Spencer failed to
repeat the objections during the actual trial. The court held that it was
unable to review his claim because he did not make a proffer of what
questions he would have asked the witnesses, and a further proffer of
what their answers would have been. Id. Without a record of both the
questions and answers, the reviewing court held that it was unable to
determine the probable impact of the testimony on the jury and
therefore could not review the issue on appeal. Id.
This decision further emphasizes that attorneys must be
sure to put on the record, in the absence of the jury, any and all
evidence that they may wish to have reviewed for claims of error.
Summary by: Thomas Marlowe

